UBI as Regular Payment: Egalitarian Safeguard or Dose of Paternalism?
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Abstract: Universal Basic Income is a welfare scheme that deliberately stays agnostic about how it is
spent and the type of people it benefits. In this paper, I argue that contrary to its façade of agnosticism,
UBI is not as carefree as its proponents say it is or wish it to be. I point out a definitional feature of UBI
that is at odds with its commitment to anti-paternalism--its insistence on continuous payment. Drawing
on the contest between Basic Income and Basic Capital, the latter of which endorses lump-sum
payments as opposed to Basic Income’s periodic ones, I suggest that UBI proponents cannot stand by its
requirement of periodicity without jeopardizing the anti-paternalistic grounds that underpin the policy.

Universal Basic Income (UBI) can be characterized by five core features: It is paid 1) periodically, 2) in
cash, 3) on an individual basis, 4) universally without a means test, and 5) unconditionally.1 In this paper,
I argue that contrary to its façade of agnosticism, UBI is not as carefree as its proponents say it is or wish
it to be. I point out a definitional feature of UBI that appears to contradict its commitment to antipaternalism: UBI as continuous payment. It is arbitrary that people are given almost absolute autonomy
over how they spend basic income (henceforth BI), yet paternalistic concerns bar them from exercising
the same autonomy to determine the interval in which they receive payment.
I do not argue that UBI’s commitment to anti-paternalism is problematic in itself. In other words, I
refrain from assessing the moral quality of recipients and whether UBI is excessively carefree as a
welfare scheme. For the purpose of this paper, I assume that the proponents’ rationale for insisting on
unconditional and universal payment is compelling. Based on this premise, I argue that hints of
paternalism are lurking in UBI, suggesting an inconsistency within its normative model.
Defendants of the right to UBI may attempt to reconcile the inconsistency on the basis of egalitarianism;
however, I demonstrate that their justifications ultimately fail. The normative inconsistency I point out
leaves UBI vulnerable to accepting other forms of mild paternalism such as the implementation of inkind benefits or basic filters for unworthy recipients.
I. Universality and Unconditionality
Philippe Van Parijs defines UBI as the following:
“By universal basic income I mean an income paid by a government, at a uniform level and at
regular intervals, to each adult member of society. The grant is paid, and its level is fixed,
irrespective of whether the person is rich or poor, lives alone or with others, is willing to work or
not. In most versions–certainly in mine–it is granted not only to citizens, but to all permanent
residents.” 2
Liberal supporters of UBI like van Parijs place great emphasis on UBI’s inclusivity and unconditionality. In
fact, some proponents of UBI would claim that the greatest strength of UBI as a welfare scheme comes
from precisely the features that maximize individual freedom and autonomy. But the very first line of
Van Parijs’ description hint at UBI’s paternalistic feature that often goes unjustified in UBI literature.
Why must UBI be paid in intervals when a lump-sum payment could maximize autonomy of the
recipient? I don’t think the answer to this question is as obvious as some UBI proponents think it is.
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I am not objecting to all limitations placed on UBI’s universality and unconditionality. I am only objecting
to ones that suggest some conflict with its normative commitment. Hence, the accusation that UBI is not
truly universal because it limits eligibility to permanent residents is not one that I am concerned with.
This limitation to UBI’s scope stems from feasibility and not necessarily from its normative commitment.
If UBI proponents were given the means to implement UBI uniformly across the globe, most of them
would welcome it. Regarding periodicity, however, proponents of UBI insist that UBI be paid in regular
intervals even with the option of lump-sum payments. They consider the condition of periodicity
integral to the normative case for UBI, which is exactly why my claim of internal inconsistency should be
taken all the more seriously by UBI proponents.
Moreover, I can only claim that there is an inconsistency between UBI’s normative commitments and its
insistence on regular payment if I can show that there is a conflict between the two that cannot be
resolved immediately. If UBI can justify these attributes within the boundaries of its normative
framework, I can no longer claim an inconsistency. Thus, I first explicate the normative commitments of
those who believe that UBI is a right in order to show that they cannot prima facie account for the
paternalism of UBI’s periodicity.
Consider the most undeserving people of UBI.
(a) Joe is a perfectly able-bodied man but he chooses not to work. Instead, he spends most of his
time at home drinking and playing games. He spends every bit of his $1000 monthly UBI
payment (his only source of income) on alcohol and buying expensive items to perform better in
his online games. He relies on his mother to financially support him and his two children.
(b) Leo is in heavy debt to his friends after making a series of unwise investments that resulted in
no return. He, however, is procrastinating on paying his debt. Whenever he receives his $1000
monthly UBI, he does not spend it on paying off his debt. He uses it to sustain his lavish lifestyle
and support other questionable investments that do not seem to pay off.
In these two scenarios, it isn’t simply that Joe and Leo are spending their UBI unwisely. Even beyond
that, UBI is clearly feeding their respective unhealthy habits in life. Worse yet, these habits are not
purely self-regarding. Joe and Leo are living in a way that harms or burdens others, and UBI is helping
them sustain such lifestyle.
Yet, the proponents of UBI refuse to revoke Joe’s and Leo’s entitlement to UBI benefits. In fact, the builtin features of UBI explicitly sanction their eligibility. In Joe’s case, UBI’s lack of a means-test does not
require that Joe work in order to receive BI. Moreover, its ‘no strings attached’ policy ensures that he
can spend it as he wishes without any repercussions. Leo, in addition to these, also takes advantage of
the fact that UBI is non-mortgageable.3 Thus, even when he is in debt, his creditor cannot seize his BI to
make up for the money owed.
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II. UBI as a Right
I assume that the proponents are right that Joe and Leo are still worthy of UBI. There are a few
normative bases for which proponents may argue that UBI should be unconditional and universal,
inclusive of people like Joe and Leo. Left-libertarians like Van Parijs would say that real freedom is the
right to pursue one’s own conception of the good life.4 Hence, a surfer in Malibu should be able to use BI
in order to sustain her lifestyle, against the reaction that she is idle and free-riding off of others’ income.
Moreover, Van Parijs suggests that one should be able to have access to different ways of life.5 Not only
should she be able maintain a reasonable living standard and be given opportunities to support her
current path in life--in this case, surfing--she should be able to pursue things she may want one day.
Real freedom is a conception of freedom so comprehensive that it is difficult to think about its limits.
Unless one’s conception of the good life involves illegal activities or is in conflict with that of others, real
freedom grants that you have a right to pursue it, no matter how idle or unhealthy your preferred
lifestyle may appear to others. Accordingly, advocates of UBI on the basis of real freedom would not be
perturbed by the fact that UBI may fund Malibu surfers, or even people more undeserving of BI like Joe
or Leo. If they really believe that UBI is a fundamental right on the basis of real freedom, they should
steadfastly stand by the belief that all three types of people deserve UBI.
It is possible to try to challenge left-libertarian proponents of UBI even further by proposing a
hypothetical scenario such that a significant number of UBI recipients happen to spend their basic
income just like Joe or Leo, unproductively and on unhealthy habits. But even given this scenario,
proponents who believe that UBI should be a fundamental right should maintain without hesitation that
UBI be unconditional and universal regardless of the unfavorable state of affairs. They may not like the
fact that a considerable number of people are using their money on alcohol, but if that is how they
decide to spend their BI, so be it. If they were to change their position on UBI after learning about the
unflattering statistics, that would mean that their support for UBI is contingent on some utilitarian
calculus, and hence not a fundamental right.6
Another way to respond to the challenge is to accept that some people will blow their BI, but claim that
this is still not a good reason for depriving others of having economic power over their own lives: “why
should their claims to real freedom be sacrificed simply to prevent others from ‘abusing’ their
freedom?”7 This position maintains that as long as there is a single person for whom BI serves an
important role in advancing their conception of the good life, it is not right to take away her BI simply
because others misuse it. Yet again, this position is contingent on the empirical condition that there is at
least a single person who is using BI wisely, or at least not unwisely. If the hypothetical scenario were
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adjusted such that somehow every single UBI recipients happened to be using BI like Joe or Leo, one is
committed to retracting support for UBI. This position, while more subtly than the earlier one, also
bases its support of UBI on a utilitarian calculus. It doesn’t actually believe that Joe and Leo’s freedom
through UBI in themselves are something worth protecting. Rather, it sees their values as something
derived from the larger goal of securing basic income for others. In other words, this position really
wishes to protect others’ right to UBI despite Joe and Leo’s misuse. Thus, if there were a way to
accurately and efficiently filter out the Joes and Leos, one may happily exclude Joes and Leos from
receiving UBI.
For those who rely on a utilitarian calculus to defend UBI, as exemplified by the two positions, not only
is UBI no longer a fundamental right (and subject to withdrawal under certain empirical circumstances),
but also universality and unconditionally need not be one of its definitional features. There would be
little reason to insist on universal and unconditional payment if the calculation of gains and loss indicate
that UBI better serves social utility when certain limitations on eligibility are imposed. As long as they
can show that refusing to pay Joe and Leo results in net social gain, revoking their claim to UBI would
not result in inconsistency with their utilitarian case. The same approach is unavailable for proponents
of UBI as a means to real freedom. Since they actively reject such utilitarian calculus, they must
relentlessly stand by UBI’s universality and unconditionality. For real freedom precisely hinge on those
features. Thus, they cannot simply declare that Joe and Leo no longer have a right to UBI without
considering the implications to their normative theory. If they wish to set minimal limitations on
universality and unconditionality, they must provide a compelling reason for doing so. The inconsistency
I point out is only really problematic to this normative position ‘UBI as a right’ proponents commit to.
Thus, from this point when I say UBI proponents, I am specifically referring to those who see UBI as a
fundamental right.
III. Basic Income vs. Basic Capital
A core feature of UBI is that it is paid in intervals. The precise interval (e.g. annual or monthly) is
flexible, but proponents of UBI strongly prefer that it be handed out regularly and not in bulk.8 The
competing alternative to BI would be stakeholder grants or basic capital (BC), which provides a lumpsum payment at the beginning of people’s adult lives.9 BC can be converted into BI, since one can decide
to divide up one’s capital in the form of a monthly income. The reverse, however, is prohibited.10
Therefore, while BC gives a recipient great flexibility in determining how and when she decides to spend
her BC, BI, on the contrary, places a temporal constraint on her spending by virtue of it being paid in
intervals. Are there good reasons BI proponents can give to justify this constraint? Yes, but not good
enough to absolve it of paternalism, or so I will argue.
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Let us consider the concrete impact BC and BI will have on individuals. Upon receiving a stake of
$800,000 in the beginning of her adult life, Lisa has the option of choosing whether she wants to spend
it incrementally throughout the span of her life or use it all at once.11 Lisa can also opt to do anything in
between (e.g. spend half of it immediately for college tuition but divvy up the rest). Under UBI, however,
Lisa’s options are more limited. Her spending is constrained by the fact that BI only comes in intervals.
She can attempt at saving her monthly income, but she is still unable to commit to an investment or
project that requires a large sum of money in the earlier stages of life. For example, if in her youth she
wanted to start a business that required a substantial start up cost, or she really needed to pay for her
tuition on top of her family’s medical bills, she would not be able to do so under the UBI plan.
The winner of the BC versus BI debate is a no brainer. Since BC can replicate the monthly payments of BI
for those who wish to spread out their spending, BC captures all of the benefits associated with BI, and
provides additional benefits that are exclusive to BC.12 The exclusive benefits BC offers are the following.
BC embraces different spending habits. The risk-averse person who prefers stable, continuous payments
can choose to spend BC in the form of a monthly income, and those who are more risk-seeking or have a
cause they would like to pursue early on in life can spend it in bulk. BC respects these different spending
habits and allows people to choose the one they prefer more, excel at, or simply need due to their
circumstances. In this manner, BC helps people reach their maximum potential through their preferred
spending behavior. Moreover, BC allows individuals to fully take charge of their lives, forming long-term
plans about using the payment without being constrained by BI’s condition of periodicity. With BI,
however, the investment-savvy, ambitious startup entrepreneur and the struggling student in debt will
have no alternative but to adjust their goals and spending plans to conform to the constrained reality of
regular, incremental payment.
BI proponents accept that through maximizing recipient autonomy, BC increases diachronic utility and
has the potential to result in the greatest amount of change in people’s lives; however, they see
something troubling about the autonomy BC provides.13 They fear that BC paves way for a recipient to
all together waste her money and be left without the opportunity to actually benefit from the promises
of BC.14 Indeed, BC does nothing to prevent Lisa from blowing her $800,000 in Las Vegas the same day
she acquires it. Once she blows it, that will be it for Lisa. For the rest of her life, she won’t be receiving
any other form of BC. In this sense, BC does not ensure lifetime sufficiency. Such dramatic loss of capital
would not occur in the case of BI. Even if Lisa wastes her monthly payment of $1000 on video games,
11
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she will be receiving another $1000 the next month. She will not be left helpless and unfunded since she
will be given numerous opportunities to make decisions about her spending.
This critique of BC, while valid, is motivated by paternalism. It is true that handing out a large one time
payment comes with the chance that the recipient wastes a big portion of it early in life. But so what if
Lisa blows her $800,000 all at once? To insist that BI be handed out periodically in order to prevent a
situation like Lisa’s does so at the expense of undermining her autonomy. It presumes that Lisa might
make bad decisions, and attempts to protect her from her own decision. Ackerman and Alstott echo this
sentiment, arguing that BI’s treatment of young people as presumptive spendthrifts “demeans their
standing as autonomous citizens and radically constrains their real freedom”.15 Indeed, BI’s goal of
ensuring lifetime sufficiency appears to be a euphemism for preventing people from messing up.
UBI proponents may attempt to justify BI’s mild paternalism on egalitarian grounds. They argue that in
order to realize the egalitarian goal of ending relationships of domination, we must ensure that
individuals are relational equals “at every point in their lives”16. Providing the same starting stakes (as BC
does) is only superficially egalitarian according to this account because it leaves people like Lisa helpless
and vulnerable to domination after some mishap.17 They further assert that BC risks exacerbating
existing interpersonal inequalities since those who will blow their stake are more likely to be people who
are already disadvantaged.18 Conversely, those who are already advantaged will have a better chance at
success thanks to the “access to better information, support and coaching.” 19 They fear that BC will
invite judgements about complete lives in which people are pronounced either winners or losers based
on how successful they have spent their BC.20 All this is made even more problematic because it
happens with the façade of equal starting point.21
Indeed, if there were a considerable number of Lisas who blew away their $800,000 soon to be faced
with social stigma, and if the underprivileged were overrepresented among this group of people, that
would mean BC enforces existing and new unequal power relations. BC would no longer be attractive on
egalitarian grounds since its goal of equalizing is subverted into exacerbating inequalities. But BI
proponents tend to overlook how BI is subject to a similar problem. Due to their upbringing, stress, lack
of financial literacy, etc, Joes or Leos may disproportionately be from the disadvantaged population. If
they start with bad habits to begin with, BI could help fund and reinforce these bad habits that
constantly put them at a socioeconomic disadvantage. Does the presence of a monthly income
necessarily ensure that they are free from domination? BI proponents can try to draw a distinction
between BI’s and BC’s impact on these types of people by responding that at least with BI, they will have
the means to turn their lives around if they choose to do so one day. This conjecture is questionable,
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however. BI decreases the incentive for them to disrupt the vicious cycle since it is difficult to see what
difference a small amount of monthly income can make. The monthly payment is “too small a sum to
give them real freedom to look decades ahead and appreciate shaping choices they are making”.22 Even
if the Joes and Leos determine to turn life around, it will take extraordinary perseverance and financial
prudence in order to continuously save up for or invest in lifting themselves up. Instead, it is more likely
that the Joes and Leos will spend it on the fly without thinking about its long-term potential because an
incremental payment of $1000 encourages consumerist spending. 23
IV. The Slippery Slope of Paternalism
This form of presumptive judgement that people, especially the underprivileged, will blow their BI is one
that UBI proponents adamantly reject; however, it isn’t clear why they put forth a similar egalitarian
challenge to discount BC. Either they shouldn’t engage in this type of reasoning at all or they should also
worry about the Joes and Leos receiving UBI. I have argued that even if we agree to examine BI and BC
from an egalitarian perspective, BI does not necessarily come out on top. But for now, suppose that BI
proponents are right that BC worsens inequalities so much more than BI--that is, there will be more Lisas
than Joes and Leos. Then, BI proponents would have successfully demonstrated that BI outperforms BC
on egalitarian grounds. I even give it that they can justify the condition of regular payment in itself on
the basis of relational egalitarianism. What they cannot justify, however, is their refusal to seriously
consider other nudges that help people spend BI more wisely, or not mess up at least. In other words, if
UBI proponents uphold BI over BC on the basis that BI better prevents people from wasting the
payment, they put themselves at a precarious position of having to accept other preventative measures
insofar as they serve an important role in advancing UBI’s egalitarian cause. For example, consider
conducting an eligibility test on those in rehabilitation or barring recipients from spending their BI on
gambling or substances like cigarettes and alcohol. For UBI proponents, they don’t seem to accept any
other form of mild paternalism for the sake of real freedom, leading to a inconsistency in their
normative case for UBI.
Beyond Lisa who tragically blows her money in Vegas, there are many other ways UBI recipients can
waste BI, as in the case of Joe and Leo. UBI proponents wish to place paternalistic safeguards against
Lisa’s spending but refuse to extend them to Joe and Leo. Is there a difference between wasting
$800,000 in bulk and wasting it gradually? UBI proponents seem to be motivated by the thought that
Lisa’s losing a fortune in Vegas is a one time mistake that she did not intend, whereas Joe’s and Leo’s
continuous, destructive spending indicates greater intentionality. Hence they come to think that setting
repercussions for Joe and Leo indicates active intervention and prohibition--a direct threat to their
autonomy--while preventing Lisa from wasting her money is gentle protection that saves herself from
something she did not will. There are a few problems with this strain of thought. First of all, it wrongly
assumes intentionality for Joe and Leo and the lack thereof for Lisa. Joe and Leo might have been
chemically addicted to substances or may have had their autonomy compromised due to unfortunate,
22
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uncontrollable circumstances like excessive stress or mental illness. They may have truly wished
someone could save them from themselves just like Lisa may have regretted her night in Vegas. But why
even assume that Lisa lacked intention in the first place? She made the active choice to gamble at her
own risk. Second, even if we assume that Joe and Leo were content with their own destructive choices
and Lisa, less so, benign paternalism is still paternalism. The government did not receive prior consent
from Lisa that she wishes to be protected from future bad choices. Hence, UBI proponents cannot draw
a clear-cut distinction between the paternalism they endorse and the paternalism they reject. Their
willingness to treat BI’s periodicity as some benign nudge is quite out of line with the reasoning they
have used to reject other paternalistic measures.
Meanwhile, BC proponents do not have to take a position of complete indifference about Lisa blowing
her $800,000. They too might wish to mitigate Lisa’s post-Vegas circumstances on egalitarian grounds.
Only BC can help Lisa make better spending choices while staying clear of paternalism. I propose a
variant of BC in which people who want to receive continuous, steady income, perhaps because they
don’t trust their own spending choices, can arrange to receive BI-like payments. With this option, people
will be protected from their own choices but only after they agree to be protected. This variant of BC
mimics the effects BI while leaving out BI’s paternalistic implications.
There is only one way UBI proponents can restore consistency within their normative model while
upholding UBI as a fundamental right. Else, they are at risk of falling into a slippery slope of paternalism.
They must strike regular payment as one of UBI’s definitional feature and instead embrace a form of BC
that aligns with their commitments to anti-paternalism.
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